“申请制”是否会抑制反倾销措施的实施？

商业研究

“申请制”是否会抑制反倾销措施的实施？

郝亮

上海财经大学经济学院，上海〓200433

收稿日期:2016-10-28 出版日期:2017-03-03
作者简介:郝亮（1987-），男，山东潍坊人，上海财经大学经济学院博士研究生，研究方向：微观经济学、国际贸易。
基金资助:
上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目“公共利益视角下贸易转移效应与反倾销措施有效性研究”，项目编号：CXJJ-2014-380。

Whether the Application System can Restrain the Implementation of Anti-dumping?

HAO Liang

School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2016-10-28 Online:2017-03-03

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于WTO反倾销守则发起反倾销调查“申请制”的规定，本文构建了反倾销税动态博弈模型，探讨申请制对反倾销措施实施的影响。研究表明：对于竞争性的国内产业，若国内厂商的边际成本高于国外厂商，则“申请制”的确会抑制反倾销措施的实施；若国内厂商的边际成本等于或低于国外厂商，则“申请制”并不会抑制竞争性产业反倾销措施的实施。因此，重构“申请制”的相关规定应是未来修订WTO反倾销守则的一个重要方面，应借助行业协会的协调作用发起竞争性行业的反倾销申请。

关键词: 反倾销, WTO守则, 公共利益

Abstract: According to the WTO anti-dumping code, the anti-dumping investigation should meet the requirements of the application system. This paper constructs a dynamic game model of anti-dumping duty to discuss the effect of application system on the implementation of anti-dumping measures. The research shows that to the competitive domestic industry, if the marginal cost of the domestic firm is higher than that of the foreign firm, the application system will certainly restrain the implementation of anti-dumping; if the marginal cost of the domestic firm is equal to or lower than that of the foreign firm, the application system will not restrain the implementation of anti-dumping. Therefore, the reconstruction of the application system should be an important aspect of the future revision of the WTO anti-dumping code, and should use the coordination role of industry association to launch anti-dumping application.

Key words: anti-dumping, WTO code, public interest

郝亮. “申请制”是否会抑制反倾销措施的实施？[J]. 商业研究.

HAO Liang. Whether the Application System can Restrain the Implementation of Anti-dumping?[J]. 商业研究.

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