注释:
①本文研究样本不包括短期融资券的原因是该品种发行数量太多,影响样本分布,且短期融资券募集资金多用于补充流动资金,受制度环境影响不大。
②考虑到篇幅这里没有列出各省市发债期限统计表。
③政府干预程度变量为反向变量,取值越大,表示该地区政府对地区内企业干预程度越小。
④东部包括北京、天津、河北、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南等10个省市。
⑤中部包括山西、安徽、江西、河南、湖北和湖南等6个省;西部包括内蒙古、广西、重庆、四川、贵州、云南、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏和新疆等11个省市区;东北包括辽宁、吉林和黑龙江等3个省。
参考文献:
[1]曹萍.金融管制、外部治理环境何企业债务工具的选择[J].南方经济,2013(7):35-47.
[2]江伟.法制环境、金融发展与企业长期债务融资[J].证券市场导报,2010(3):50-57.
[3]江春,许立成.产权、法律制度与中国金融发展之谜[J].财经问题研究,2004(8):39-44.
[4]卢峰,姚洋.金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长[J].中国社会科学,2004(1):42-55.
[5]黎凯,叶建芳.财政分权下政府干预对企业债务融资的影响[J].管理世界,2007(8).
[6]李湛.中国企业债务结构和债务工具选择的理论和实证研究[D].广州:暨南大学博士学位论文,2011.
[7]罗荣华,刘劲劲.地方政府的隐性担保真的有效吗?-基于城投债发行定价的检验[J].金融研究,2016(4):83-97.
[8]李健,陈传明.企业家政治关联、所有制与企业债务期限结构——基于转型经济制度背景的实证研究[J].金融研究,2013(3):157-169.
[9]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为[J].经济研究,2011(12):72-85.
[10]孙铮,刘凤委,李赠泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5):52-63.
[11]史永东,田渊博.契约条款影响债券价格吗?[J].金融研究,2016(8):143-158.
[12]王雄元,张春强,何捷.宏观经济波动性与短期融资券风险溢价[J].金融研究,2015(1):68-83.
[13]唐清泉,罗党论.政府控制、银企关系与企业担保行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007(3):151-161.
[14]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8):9-39.
[15]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[16]张寻远.中国区域债务融资工具发展研究[D].成都:西南财经大学博士学位论文,2013.
[17]Allen, F., Gale, D. Comparing Financial Systems[M].MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,2000.
[18]Christophe J Godlewski. Banking environment and loan syndicate structure: a cross-country analysis[J].Applied Financial Economics, 2010,20(8):637-648.
[19]Diamond and Douglas,W. Monitoring and Reputation, The Choice between Bank Loan and Directly Placed Debt[J].Journal of Political Economy,1991,99(4):689-721.
[20]Diamond. Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991(106):709-737.
[21]Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Levine. Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets and Development,2001.
[22]Darius P. Miller, John J. Puthenpurackal. The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds”, William Davidson Working Paper Number 445,2001.
[23]Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale. Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1997,105(3):523-546.
[24]Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Meijun Qian. Law, finance, and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:57-116.
[25]Hart, Oliver and James Moore. Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management[J].The American Economic Review,1995,85(3):567-585.
[26]Jose Guedes and Tim Opler. The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues[J].Journal of Finnace,1996,51(1):1809-1833.
[27]Jun Qian, Philip E. Strahan. How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans[J].The Journal of Finance,2007,62(6):2803-2834.
[28]Kane A, Marcus A J, Mcdonald R L. Debt Policy and the Rate of Reture Premium of Leverage[J].Journal of Finnacial and Quantitative Analysis, 1985(20): 479-500.
[29]Katharina Pistor, Chenggang Xu. Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China[J].American Law and Economics Review,2005,7(1):184-210.
[30]Kee-Hong Bae, Vidhan K. Goyal. Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans, Journal of Finance, 2009,64(2):823-860.
[31].Macro Pagano, Tullio Jappelli. Information Sharing in Credit Markets[J].The Journal of Finance,1993,48(5):1693-1718.
[32]Pavel Korner.The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structre: Evidence from Czech Firm[J].Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007(3-4):142-158.
[33]Rajan, R.G.and Zingales,L. What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data[J].Journal of Finance,1995,50(5):1421-1460. |