商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管薪酬外部公平性、产权性质与企业风险承担

金静1,2，汪燕敏3   

  1. （1.中南财经政法大学 会计学院，武汉 430073;2.安徽财经大学会计学院，安徽 蚌埠 233030； 3.安徽财经大学 统计与应用数学学院，安徽 蚌埠 233030）
  • 收稿日期:2017-12-26 出版日期:2018-04-27
  • 作者简介:金静（1980-），女，安徽涡阳人，安徽财经大学会计学院讲师，中南财经政法大学会计学院博士研究生，研究方向：收入动态和财务管理；汪燕敏（1980-），男，浙江江山人，安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院助理研究员，经济学博士，研究方向：社会保障与收入分配。
  • 基金资助:
    安徽高校人文社科重点项目，项目编号：SK2016A0021；安徽财经大学校级科研项目，项目编号：ACKY1628；安徽财经大学校级重点科研项目，项目编号：ACKY1709ZDB。

External Fairness of Executive Compensation, Property Right Nature and Enterprise Risk Taking

JIN Jing1,2,WANG Yan-min3   

  1. (1. Accounting School, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073,China;2. Accounting School, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030,China;3. Institute of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030,China)
  • Received:2017-12-26 Online:2018-04-27

摘要： 基于社会比较理论与公平理论，本文分析高管薪酬外部公平性对企业风险承担水平的影响，发现高管薪酬外部公平性越高，企业风险承担水平越大；区分产权性质以后，国有企业高管薪酬外部公平性对企业风险承担影响不显著，非国有企业高管薪酬外部公平性对企业风险承担水平有显著的影响；高管薪酬外部公平性可以显著提高企业经营业绩，风险承担在高管薪酬外部公平性与经营业绩之间发挥部分中介效用（这是一个新的发现）。本文的研究丰富了高管薪酬公平理论，为风险承担行为相关理论的研究提供了新视角；研究结论支持了对国有企业和非国有企业高管采取不同的薪酬激励方法与不同的业绩考核体系。

关键词: 公平性, 风险承担, 高管薪酬

Abstract: Based on social comparison theory and equity theory, this paper analyzes the effect of external fairness of executive compensation on the level of enterprise risk taking, finding that the higher external fairness of executive compensation, the higher level of enterprises′ risk taking; considering property right nature, the impact of external fairness of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises on the risk taking is not significant, while the impact of external fairness of executive compensation in non-state enterprises on the risk taking is significant; external fairness of executive compensation can significantly improve the enterprises′ performance and the risk taking plays a partial mediating role between the external fairness of executive compensation and enterprises′ performance, which is a new finding. This study enriches the theory of executive compensation fairness and provides a new perspective for the study of risk taking behavior theory; the conclusions support that it is appropriate to adopt different compensation incentive methods and performance appraisal systems for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises′ executives.

Key words: fairness, risk taking, executive compensation