商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 •    下一篇

供应链联合促销机会主义的演化博弈分析

田永杰1,2，王文举1,3   

  1. （1.首都经济贸易大学 经济学院，北京 100070；2．郑州西亚斯学院，河南 新郑 451150； 3.北京物资学院 经济学院，北京 101149）
  • 收稿日期:2019-06-10 出版日期:2019-12-24
  • 作者简介:田永杰（1972-），男，河南开封人，首都经济贸易大学博士研究生，研究方向：博弈论与经济分析；王文举（1965-），男，吉林东丰人，首都经济贸易大学经济学院教授，博士生导师，理学博士，研究方向：博弈论与经济分析。
  • 基金资助:
    ：国家社科基金重大项目，项目编号：14ZDA072；河南省民办高校品牌专业建设项目，项目编号：教政法〔2017〕344号。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Joint Promotion Opportunism

TIAN Yong-jie1,2，WANG Wen-ju1,3   

  1. (1.School of Economics,Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China;2. Zhengzhou Sias University, Xinzheng 451150,China;3.School of Economics, Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
  • Received:2019-06-10 Online:2019-12-24

摘要： 零售商在联合促销中存在机会主义，造成制造商资源浪费。本文利用演化博弈模型分析制造商和零售商联合促销互动进程中的演化路径，并通过仿真模拟了零售商机会主义对演化路径的影响。研究表明：零售商的机会主义程度影响联合促销博弈参与方的策略选择，不同机会主义程度下的博弈演化路径不同；零售商通过费用截留获得额外收益是机会主义存在的原因，制造商是否对机会主义进行治理取决于处罚收入和治理成本的大小关系及零售商机会主义的程度，机会主义过大或过小，制造商都会选择不治理策略；零售商机会主义大于一定值后，零售商将选择不截留策略；当机会主义处于一定阈值内，根据制造商的处罚收入是否大于治理成本，市场将处于治理困境或制造商的“不作为”状态。

关键词: 联合促销, 机会主义, 演化博弈

Abstract: Abstract：There is opportunism in retailers′ joint promotion, which results in the waste of manufacturers′ resources. In this paper, evolutionary game model is used to analyze the evolutionary path in the interactive process of joint promotion between manufacturer and retailer, and the influence of retailer opportunism on the evolutionary path is simulated.The results show that: retailers′ opportunism degree influences participants′ strategy choice in the joint promotion game, and the evolution path of the game is different under different opportunism degrees;the reason for the existence of opportunism is that the retailer obtains additional income through expense withholding, and whether the manufacturer governs opportunism depends on the relationship between the penalty income and the cost of governance and the degree of the retailers′ opportunism:if the opportunism is too large or too small, the manufacturer will choose the strategy of non governance; when retailers′ opportunism is greater than a certain value, the retailer will choose the strategy of non interception; when the opportunism is within a certain threshold, the market will be in a governance dilemma or the manufacturer′s “inaction” state according to whether the penalty income of the manufacturer is greater than the governance cost.

Key words: Key words：joint promotion, opportunism, evolutionary game