商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

土地财政、地方政府行为与企业全要素生产率——基于沪深两市A股上市公司2007—2017年数据的分析

马震   

  1. （西安财经大学 商学院，西安 710100）
  • 收稿日期:2019-09-09 出版日期:2020-02-12
  • 作者简介:马震（1976-），女，河北保定人，西安财经大学商学院副教授，陕西师范大学工商管理流动站博士后，研究方向：发展经济学、区域旅游经济。
  • 基金资助:
    陕西省教育厅重点课题，项目编号：19JZ033；陕西省社会科学基金项目，项目编号：2017D036。

Land Finance, Local Government Behavior and Total Factor Productivity of . Enterprises: An Analysis based on the Data of A-share Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets from 2007 to 2017

MA Zhen   

  1. (School of Business,Xi′an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’ an 710100,China）
  • Received:2019-09-09 Online:2020-02-12

摘要： ：作为中国的一种特殊财政现象，土地财政影响微观经济主体的生产行为及其效率。本文以2007—2017年我国上市企业为分析对象，通过纳入地方政府意志探究土地财政对微观企业全要素生产率影响的差异特征。研究发现，地方土地财政强度越大对企业全要素生产率产生的抑制作用越明显，而不同属性的企业在面对土地财政的影响时存在差异化的表现；从宏观影响机制来看，土地财政强度越大越会抑制区域层面的技术交流，并驱动地方对基础设施进行建设投资，对企业全要素生产率形成抑制作用；从微观影响机制来看，土地财政强度越大越会驱使企业强化金融杠杆以获取更多金融资源，这样的后果之一就是企业的财务稳定性下降，并对企业的研发投入造成挤出，不利于全要素生产率的提升。此外，地方政府的考核制度会影响“土地财政—企业全要素生产率”范式，“为增长而竞争”的制度激励强化了土地财政的负向抑制作用，“为创新而竞争”的制度激励则能够在一定程度上中和土地财政的不利影响。

关键词: 关键词：土地财政, 企业全要素生产率, 地方政府行为, 传导机制.

Abstract: As a special fiscal phenomenon in China, land finance affects the production behavior and efficiency of microeconomic subjects.This paper takes the listed enterprises in China from 2007 to 2017 as the analysis object, and explores the different characteristics of the impact of land finance on total factor productivity of micro enterprises by incorporating the will of local governments.It is found that the greater the intensity of local land finance is, the more obvious the inhibitory effect is on the total factor productivity of enterprises; from the perspective of macro impact mechanism, the greater the financial intensity of land, the more it will restrain the technology exchange at the regional level, and drive the local government to invest in infrastructure construction, which will restrain the total factor productivity of enterprises;from the perspective of micro impact mechanism, the greater the financial strength of land will drive enterprises to strengthen financial leverage to obtain more financial resources,and one of the consequences is that the financial stability of enterprises will decline, and the R&D investment of enterprises will be squeezed out, which is not conducive to the increase of total factor productivity.In addition, the assessment system of local government will affect the paradigm of “Land Finance-Total Factor Productivity of enterprises”, the system incentive of “competition for growth” strengthens the negative inhibition of land finance, and the system incentive of “competition for innovation” can neutralize the adverse effect of land finance to a certain extent.

Key words: Key words：land finance, enterprise total factor productivity, local government behavior, transmission mechanism