商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于再融资新规的定向增发利润承诺信号博弈研究

张莹1，李德龙2   

  1. （1.四川大学 商学院， 成都 610064；2. 东北财经大学 管理科学与工程学院，辽宁 大连116025）
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-30 出版日期:2020-09-21
  • 作者简介:张莹（1983-），女，辽宁葫芦岛人，四川大学商学院博士研究生，研究方向：企业微观金融决策、公司金融；李德龙（1989-），本文通讯作者，男，黑龙江绥化人，东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院博士研究生，研究方向：博弈论、科学决策。

Research on the Signaling Game of Profit Commitment of Private Placement based on New Rules of Refinancing

ZHANG Ying1, LI De-long2   

  1. （1.Business School of Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064,China；2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025,China）
  • Received:2020-05-30 Online:2020-09-21

摘要： 为深入分析定增利润承诺的作用机制和定增新规的管制效应，本文基于利润承诺的信号特性，构建再融资新规下的定向增发利润承诺信号博弈模型，并采用逆向归纳法得出Nash均衡路径。研究发现，若利润承诺额度越高、利润承诺对投资者情绪的提升效果越显著，则定增企业被寻求履约的概率越大；在混同均衡路径下，为降低高质量企业和低质量企业使用利润承诺的概率，监管部门应鼓励企业提升大股东或大股东关联方的认购比例、为投资者提供较高的发行折扣率，同时提升高质量企业的承诺额度审核标准、加强低质量企业的违约惩罚力度。在分离均衡路径下，监管部门应提升违约惩罚力度，以防止利润承诺被低质量企业滥用；应控制高质量企业的利润承诺额度上限，以保障低质量企业的生存发展空间。

关键词: 利润承诺, 定向增发, 再融资新规, 信号传递博弈

Abstract: In order to deeply analyze the mechanism of profit commitment and the regulatory effect of the new regulation, based on the signal characteristics of profit commitment, this paper constructs a signaling game model of private placement profit commitment under the new regulation of refinancing, and uses the reverse induction method to obtain Nash equilibrium path.It is found that the higher the amount of profit commitment and the more significant the effect of profit commitment on investor sentiment, the greater the probability that fixed increase enterprises will be sought to fulfill the contract; under the mixed equilibrium path, in order to reduce the probability of using profit commitment by high-quality enterprises and low-quality enterprises, the regulatory authorities should encourage enterprises to increase the subscription proportion of major shareholders or related parties of major shareholders, provide investors with higher discount rate of issuance, and at the same time, improve the audit standard of commitment amount of high-quality enterprises and strengthen the punishment for default of low-quality enterprises.Under the separation equilibrium path, the regulatory authorities should enhance the punishment for breach of contract to prevent the profit commitment from being abused by low-quality enterprises, and control the upper limit of profit commitment of high-quality enterprises to ensure the survival and development space of low-quality enterprises.

Key words: profit commitment, private placement, new regulation of refinancing, signaling game