商业研究

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期望绩效反馈、行业竞争压力与企业并购 ——基于沪深A股上市公司的实证研究

黄昌富,李桑迪   

  1. 三峡大学 经济与管理学院,湖北 宜昌 443002
  • 收稿日期:2017-06-02 出版日期:2017-10-10
  • 作者简介:黄昌富(1959-),男,湖北当阳人,三峡大学经济与管理学院教授,研究方向:战略管理;李桑迪(1992-),女,湖北当阳人,三峡大学经济与管理学院研究生,研究方向:战略管理。

Expectation Performance Feedback,Industry Competitive Pressure and Enterprise M&A: An Empirical Study based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A - share Listed Companies

HUANG Chang-fu, LI Sang-di   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China
  • Received:2017-06-02 Online:2017-10-10

摘要: 并购是企业利用外部资源实现竞争优势的战略选择,本文以2011-2015年间沪深两市发生并购行为主并方的A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察企业期望绩效反馈、行业竞争压力与企业并购行为的关系,以及行业竞争压力对期望绩效反馈与企业并购之间关系的调节作用。研究发现,当企业期望绩效反馈为负向时,随着期望绩效差距的扩大,企业并购意愿及并购规模先升后降,呈倒U型关系;行业竞争压力正向促进企业并购行为,当企业未实现组织期望绩效时,行业竞争压力对期望绩效差距与企业并购行为的倒U型关系存在显著的正向调节效应。上述结论深化了对期望绩效反馈问题的认识,间接考察了企业高管与股东或董事会之间在期望绩效差距存在的情况下在企业并购决策上的分工机制,为企业并购行为的影响因素提供了新的视角,对经理层和股东如何通过理性的并购决策弥合期望绩效差距、防范并购风险具有一定的理论解释意义和实践参考价值。

关键词: 期望绩效反馈, 行业竞争压力, 企业并购

Abstract: M&A is a strategic choice for enterprises to realize competitive advantage by using external resources. This paper takes the acquirers in A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as research samples from 2011 to 2015, and investigates the relationship between the expected performance feedback, the competitive pressure of the industry and M&A behavior, and the moderating effect of competitive pressure on the relationship between expected performance feedback and mergers and acquisitions. The results show that when the expected performance feedback is negative, with the widening of expected performance gap, the M&A intention and scale will rise first and then fall, showing inverted U- shaped relationship; industry competition pressure promotes the M&A positively, when the expected performance of the organization is not realized, the competitive pressure of the industry has a significantly positive effect on the inverted U-shaped relationship between expected performance gap and M&A behavior.The above conclusions deepen the understanding of expected performance feedback, indirectly investigate the division mechanism between enterprise executives and shareholders or board of directors in the process of enterprise M&A decision-making under the expectation performance gap, and provide a new perspective for influence factors of M&A behavior, which has theoretical significance and practical reference value for managers and shareholders how to close the expected performance gap and prevent M&A risk though rational M&A decision-making.

Key words: expected performance feedback, industry competitive pressure, enterprise mergers and acquisitions