政府质量、财务透明与企业融资约束
——基于中国制造业企业问卷调查数据的分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在相关制度不完善的转型经济体中，政府质量和财务透明对信贷资源配置发挥重要的影响，从而影响企业融资约束。对于这种影响的效果及作用机理，本文使用2012年世界银行关于中国2848家企业的问卷调查数据进行检验与考察。研究发现，政府对企业融资具有“扶持之手”的作用，通过降低腐败水平、增强政治稳定性、提高法律系统质量、强化社会治安和降低税负等手段，为企业融资提供一个良好的制度环境，提高政府质量有利于缓解企业融资约束；同时，提高企业财务透明度能够有效降低企业与融资机构间的信息不对称，亦能够强化企业获得外部融资的能力，缓解企业融资约束问题；政府质量具有调节作用，在政府质量较高的地区，财务透明对企业融资约束的缓解作用更强。

关键词: 政府质量, 财务透明, 融资约束, 倾向得分匹配

Abstract: In the transition economies with imperfect institution, government quality and financial transparence play key roles in allocating credit resource, thus it affects firm′s financing constraint. For the effect and mechanism of this effect, this paper carries out test and investigation by using World Bank questionnaire data from 2848 Chinese Enterprises. The results show that, the government gives a helping hand to those firms which are in trouble in terms of financing: government can enhance the level of government quality by reducing the corruption level, strengthening the politic stability, improving the quality of legal system, reinforcing public security and reducing tax burden to provide a good institutional environment for enterprise financing and improve the government quality, which is conducive to relieving the problem of financing constraint; meanwhile, enhancing firm financial transparence can effectively reduce the information asymmetry between enterprises and financing institutions and improve the ability of access to external financing, then mitigate the problem of financing constraint; government quality has a regulatory role, and financial transparence has a stronger effect in mitigating the firm′s financing constraint in the region with higher level of government quality.

Key words: government quality；financial transparence, financing constraint, propensity score matching

李后建. 政府质量、财务透明与企业融资约束 ——基于中国制造业企业问卷调查数据的分析[J]. 商业研究.

LI Hou-jian. Government Quality, Financial Transparence and Firm Financing Constraint: An Analysis based on Questionnaire Data of Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises[J]. 商业研究.

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政府质量、财务透明与企业融资约束 ——基于中国制造业企业问卷调查数据的分析

Government Quality, Financial Transparence and Firm Financing Constraint: An Analysis based on Questionnaire Data of Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises

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