商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

粮食托市收储内部监管及合谋防范 ——基于政府规制视角的双层委托代理分析

普蓂喆1， 郑风田2， 丁冬3   

  1. （1. 中国农业科学院 农业经济与发展研究所，北京 100081； 2. 中国人民大学 农业与农村发展学院， 北京 100872； 3. 国家烟草专卖局烟草经济研究所，北京 100045）
  • 收稿日期:2019-03-21 出版日期:2019-08-22
  • 作者简介:普蓂喆（1989-），女，昆明人，中国农业科学院农业经济与发展研究所助理研究员，研究方向：粮食安全与农业支持政策；郑风田（1965-），本文通讯作者，男，河南驻马店人，中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院教授，研究方向：粮食安全和食品安全；丁冬（1987-），男，山东栖霞人，国家烟草专卖局烟草经济研究所经济师，研究方向：农产品市场与安全管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目“我国政府粮食储备的规模优化与政策评价”，项目编号：71673289；国家社会科学基金项目“供给侧结构性改革背景下我国粮食流通收储政策转变与反应机制研究”，项目编号：17BJY115。

Internal Supervision and Collusion Proof in China′s Grain Procurement Policy: Two-layer Principle-agent Analysis from the Perspective of Government Regulation

PU Ming-zhe1, ZHENG Feng-tian2, DING Dong3   

  1. (1. Institute of Agricultural Economics and Development, CAAS, Beijing 100081,China;2. School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872,China;3. Tobacco Economy Research Institute, State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, Beijing 100045,China)
  • Received:2019-03-21 Online:2019-08-22

摘要： 托市收储监管漏洞频发影响粮食市场调控效果和国家粮食安全，做好托市收储内部监管关系种粮农民切身利益、国家粮食宏观调控效果和国家粮食安全。粮食托市收储的垂直管理体系构成了双层委托代理结构，通过构建“政府-中储粮-代储库”三层监管模型推导政府防范中储粮和代储库合谋的最优制度设计及其比较静态特征，分析表明信息租金在政府监管能力有限的情况下成为代储库向中储粮寻租的基础。为了防止合谋、引导企业规范收储，政府需要补偿两者不合谋造成的效用损失，或者政府罚金数量必须要高于其合谋收益，而中储粮成本权衡、收储目标冲突和反向激励等现实制约会导致政府监管效力减弱。

关键词: 托市收储, 委托代理, 信息租金, 合谋防范

Abstract: The frequent loopholes in the regulation of collection and storage in procurement affect the regulation effect of grain market and national food security,so doing a good job of the internal supervision of the collection and storage of procurement is related to the vital interests of grain farmers, the effect of national grain macro-control and national food security.The vertical management system of China′s grain procurement policy actually constitutes two levels of principal-agent structure.By building a three-tier management model consisting of “Government-China Grain Reserve-Agent companies”,the optimal regulation rules and collusion-proof contract are deduced. The theoretical analysis shows that information rent becomes the basis of rent-seeking from grain storage on behalf of warehouse under the condition of limited government supervision ability.In order to prevent collusion and guide enterprises to regulate storage, the government needs to compensate for the loss of utility caused by the non-collusion, or the amount of government fines must be higher than its fair income. The practical constraints such as cost balance of grain storage, conflict of storage objectives and reverse incentives will lead to the weakening of the effectiveness of government supervision.

Key words: grain procurement, principal-agent structure, information rents, collusion proof