商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

股权激励收益不足是否影响高管离职？ ——基于指派模型理论的视角

刘倩茹，徐咏仪，余鹏翼   

  1. （广东外语外贸大学 会计学院，广州 510000）
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-01 出版日期:2020-10-19
  • 作者简介:刘倩茹（1987-），女，四川绵阳人，广东外语外贸大学会计学院讲师，会计学博士，研究方向：管理层薪酬、行为金融；徐咏仪（1995-），女，广东揭阳人，广东外语外贸大学会院学院硕士研究生，研究方向：公司治理、并购；余鹏翼（1971-），本文通讯作者，男，安徽六安人，广东外语外贸大学会计学院教授，博士生导师，经济学博士，研究方向：财务审计、跨国并购。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目,项目编号:71972057，71872121；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目，项目编号：19YJC630105；广东省科技厅科技计划项目，项目编号：2020B1010010012。

Does Insufficient Equity Incentive Returns Affect Executive Turnover? Based on the Assignment Model Theory

LIU Qian-ru, XU Yong-yi, YU Peng-yi   

  1. （School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510000,China)
  • Received:2020-06-01 Online:2020-10-19

摘要： 本文基于经典的指派模型理论，以2008-2018年民营企业实施的股权激励计划为样本，从经理人、市场供需双方的视角分析股权激励收益不足对高管离职的影响。研究发现，股权激励中普遍存在收益不足的问题且逐年严重。当管理层的收益小于与其业绩贡献相匹配的水平，会显著地增加其离职概率；当公司业绩高于市场平均水平、行业竞争程度较高或行业高管平均薪酬高于高管个人薪酬时，股权激励收益不足对高管离职的影响更为显著；同时，股权激励收益不足会通过提升高管离职概率进而对公司业绩、股市表现产生显著的负面影响。研究结论反映我国经理人市场效率仍很低下，管理层有效激励仍是企业有待解决的重要问题。

关键词: 股权激励, 收益不足, 高管离职, 经理人市场, 指派模型

Abstract: Based on the classic assignment model theory, this paper uses the equity incentive plan implemented by private enterprises from 2008 to 2018 as a sample to analyze the impact of insufficient equity incentive returns on executive turnover from the perspective of both manager and the supply and demand side of labor market. It is found that there is a problem of insufficient returns in equity incentive, which is serious year by year. When the manager′s income is less than the level matching with its performance contribution, the turnover probability will be significantly increased; when the company′s performance is higher than the average market level, the degree of industry competition is higher, or the average compensation of industry executives is higher than the individual salary of executives, the impact of insufficient equity incentive income on the turnover of executives is more significant;at the same time, the insufficient return on equity incentive will have a significantly negative impact on corporate performance and stock market performance by increasing the turnover probability of executives. The conclusion shows that the market efficiency of manager in China is still very low, and the effective incentive of management is still an important problem to be solved.

Key words: equity incentive, earnings shortage, executive turnover, manager market, assignment model