商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

国企多任务努力成本相关下的高管激励问题

李禹桥1，2，李克强1   

  1. （1.北京师范大学 政府管理学院，北京 100875；2.黑龙江科技大学 管理学院，哈尔滨 150020）
  • 收稿日期:2019-08-03 出版日期:2020-02-12
  • 作者简介:李禹桥（1982-），女，黑龙江哈尔滨人，北京师范大学政府管理学院博士研究生，黑龙江科技大学管理学院讲师，研究方向：国企改革、行政管理、财务管理；李克强（1955-），男，辽阳人，北京师范大学政府管理学院教授，博士生导师，理论物理学博士，研究方向：博弈论、信息经济学、劳动经济学。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目，项目编号：16ZZD049；教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目，项目编号：17JZD013。

The Multi-task Incentive Problem For SOE Managers Under The Correlated . Effort Cost

LI Yu-qiao1,2,LI Ke-qiang1.   

  1. (1.School of Government Administration, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875,China;. 2.School of Management, Heilongjiang University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150020,China)
  • Received:2019-08-03 Online:2020-02-12

摘要： 本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom多任务委托代理模型的分析框架下，建立国有企业的三任务模型，探讨国企多任务努力成本相关下高管激励问题。研究发现，当多任务为互补时，实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务产生互补促进性作用，有利于经济性任务目标的实现，增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的提高。当多任务为替代时，实现企业社会责任目标会对企业经济性任务目标的实现产生阻碍作用，不利于经济性任务目标的实现，增加可观测性较高的任务激励会带来互补性任务绩效的减少。当多任务为不相关时，任务间努力成本互相独立，实现企业的政策性任务与其他任务努力成本不相关，应剥离政策性任务。该结论对于国有企业的任务选择与指派，以及存在多任务时的激励机制设计具有重要参考价值。

关键词: 关键词：国有企业, 委托代理, 激励机制, 多任务模型, 努力成本相关性.

Abstract: Abstract：Under the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom′s multi task principal-agent model, this paper establishes a three task model of state-owned enterprises, and discusses the executive incentive issues related to the multi task effort cost of state-owned enterprises.It is found that when the multi-task is complementary, the realization of corporate social responsibility goal will promote the economic task, which is conducive to the realization of economic task goal. Increasing the task incentive with high observability will lead to the improvement of complementary task performance.When multi-task is the substitute, the realization of corporate social responsibility will hinder the realization of corporate economic task, which is not conducive to the realization of economic task,while increasing task motivation with high observability will reduce the performance of complementary tasks.When the multi- task is not related, the effort cost between tasks is independent of each other. To realize the policy task is not related to the effort cost of other tasks, the policy task should be separated.This conclusion has important reference value for the task selection and assignment of state-owned enterprises, as well as the incentive mechanism design when there are multiple tasks.

Key words: Key words：state owned enterprises, principal-agent, incentive mechanism, multi-task model, effort cost correlation