董事会资本、CEO权力对研发投入的影响
——来自创业板上市公司数据的分析

商业研究

董事会资本、CEO权力对研发投入的影响 ——来自创业板上市公司数据的分析

王楠1,2，何娇1，黄静1

北京工商大学 1.商学院；2.国有资产管理协同创新中心，北京 100048

收稿日期:2016-08-13 出版日期:2017-01-10
作者简介:王楠（1983-），女（朝鲜族），辽宁营口人，北京工商大学商学院副教授，管理学博士，研究方向：创新管理、战略投资；何娇（1993-），女，四川广元人，北京工商大学商学院研究生，研究方向：创新管理；黄静（1989-），女，河南驻马店人，北京工商大学商学院研究生，研究方向：创新管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目，项目编号：71602006；教育部人文社科青年基金项目，项目编号：16YJC630121；科技创新平台-商科特色项目2017资助；北京市社会科学基金项目，项目编号：15ZDB22

The Effect of Board of Directors Capital and CEO Power on R&D Investment： An Analysis of Data from GEM Listed Corporation

WANG Nan1,2,HE Jiao1, HUANG Jing1

1.School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China; 2.Collaborative Innovation Centre for State-owned Assets Administration, Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048, China

Received:2016-08-13 Online:2017-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以我国创业板上市公司为样本，从董事会人力资本和社会资本两方面探讨董事会资本与企业研发投入之间的关系，并检验CEO权力对董事会资本与企业研发投入关系的影响。实证结果表明：董事会人力资本正向影响企业研发投入，董事会社会资本负向影响企业研发投入；CEO权力减弱了董事会社会资本对企业研发投入的负向影响，但对董事会人力资本与企业研发投入之间的关系没有影响；高级职称、执行董事占比负向调节董事会人力资本与研发投入之间的关系，两职性正向调节董事会人力资本与企业研发投入之间的关系；CEO所有权、两职性负向调节董事会社会资本与企业研发投入之间的关系。

关键词: 董事会人力资本, 董事会社会资本, CEO权力, 研发投入

Abstract: This paper studied the relationship between board capital and R&D investment from the aspects of human capital and social capital of board of directors and tested the effect of CEO power on the relationship between board capital and R&D investment with the sample of the data of GEM listed companies. Empirical results show that：board of directors human capital has a positive effect on R&D investment, while board of directors social capital has a negative effect on R&D investment; CEO power weakens the negative effect of board of directors social capital on R&D investment, but has no effect on the relationship between board of directors human capital and R&D investment; senior titles and the proportion of executive directors negatively moderate the relationship between board of directors human capital and R&D investment, and CEO duality positively moderates this relationship; CEO ownership and CEO duality negatively moderate the relationship between board of directors social capital and R&D investment.

Key words: board of directors human capital, board of directors social capital, CEO power, R&D investment

王楠1,2，何娇1，黄静1. 董事会资本、CEO权力对研发投入的影响 ——来自创业板上市公司数据的分析[J]. 商业研究.

WANG Nan1,2,HE Jiao1, HUANG Jing1. The Effect of Board of Directors Capital and CEO Power on R&D Investment： An Analysis of Data from GEM Listed Corporation[J]. 商业研究.

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