商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

——经理人市场竞争对公司高管权力和行为约束效应分析

卢馨1，丁艳平1，汪柳希2   

  1. 1. 暨南大学 管理学院，广州 510632；2. 重庆邮电大学 审计处，重庆 400065
  • 收稿日期:2016-06-10 出版日期:2017-01-10
  • 作者简介:卢馨（1963-），女，台湾台南人，暨南大学管理学院教授，管理学博士，研究方向：公司财务与公司治理、人力资源价值与激励；丁艳平（1993-），男，南昌人，暨南大学管理学院研究生，研究方向：会计与公司财务实证研究、公司治理；汪柳希（1990-），女，重庆南岸人，重庆邮电大学审计处，研究方向：公司财务与公司治理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目，项目编号：71171097；暨南大学企业发展研究所重大项目，项目编号：2014ZD001；广东大学生科技创新培育专项资金项目资助。

Can the Marketization of Manager Constrain State-owned Enterprises′ Executive Corruption?——An Analysis of the Effect of Manager Market Competition

LU Xin1，DING Yan-ping1，WANG Liu-xi2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China; 2. Department of Auditing, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China
  • Received:2016-06-10 Online:2017-01-10

摘要： 本文利用2004-2014年间证券交易所和媒体披露的高管腐败案例样本，从经理人市场化的地区、行业差异的角度出发，分析经理人市场竞争对公司高管权力和行为的约束效应。研究结果表明：经理人市场竞争约束企业高管腐败行为的作用在东部地区比中西部地区强、在非垄断行业比垄断行业强；经理人的市场竞争对民营企业高管的腐败行为有所约束，这种约束作用会随地区和行业经理人市场化程度的增高而加强；但由于我国国有企业经理人市场失灵，经理人市场竞争约束并不能抑制国有企业高管的腐败行为。

关键词: 国有企业, 高管腐败, 经理人市场竞争, 市场化

Abstract: Taking cases of executives corruption disclosed by stock exchange corporations and media from 2004 to 2014 as samples, and based on the differences of districts and industries of the managerial labor market competition, this paper tests the constrained impacts of the managerial labor market competition on executive′s power and behaviors. The results show that the managerial labor market competition′s constrain effects on executive corruptions is stronger in the east regions than in the central and west regions, in the non-monopoly industries than the monopoly industry; the managerial labor market′s competition has some constrain on private corporate executive corruptions, and the constrain effects increases while the degree of the region and industry managerial labor market become strong; as to the failure of the state-owned enterprise managerial labor market, the managerial labor market does not constrain the state-owned enterprises′ executive corruptions.

Key words: state-owned enterprises, executive corruption, managerial labor market competition, marketization