闭环供应链企业合作减排与定价策略

商业研究

闭环供应链企业合作减排与定价策略

李辉1，汪传旭1，欧卫2

1.上海海事大学经济管理学院，上海 201306； 2.北陆先端科学技术大学院大学知识科学学院，日本 923-1292

收稿日期:2017-01-17 出版日期:2017-05-25
作者简介:李辉(1985-)，男，广西南宁人，上海海事大学经济管理学院博士研究生，研究方向：物流与供应链管理；汪传旭(1967-)，男，安徽安庆人，上海海事大学经济管理学院教授，博士生导师，工学博士，研究方向：物流与供应链管理、港口与航运管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目，项目编号：71373157；上海海事大学研究生创新基金项目，项目编号：2016ycx068。

Pricing and Cooperation Strategy of Enterprises′ Carbon Emission Reduction in Closed-loop Supply Chain

LI Hui1, WANG Chuan-xu1, OU Wei2

1.School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China；2. School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa 923-1292, Japan

Received:2017-01-17 Online:2017-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 闭环供应链中制造商和零售商不同的合作减排模式对减排率、回收率、定价、利润和减排效果会产生不同影响。本文考虑由单一制造商、零售商和第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链系统，构建不合作、半合作(分担减排成本和议价)、完全合作形式闭环供应链的减排率、回收率和价格决策模型，并进行对比分析。结果表明：在总体上，完全合作减排在实现最高减排水平、最高回收水平和最低零售价格的同时，取得了最高的联合利润和最高的减排效用；对于两种半合作减排方式，除制造商利润外，议价半合作减排的减排水平、回收水平、批发价格、零售价格、零售商利润、联合利润、第三方利润和减排效用均高于分担减排成本契约半合作减排。现实中最理想的完全合作减排合作模式很难达成，因此政府应采取措施着重促成两种半合作减排方式。

关键词: 合作, 减排, 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The different modes of cooperation between manufacturers and retailers have different effects on the emission reduction rate, recovery rate, pricing, profits and emission reduction utility in closed-loop supply chain. Considering closed-loop supply chain consisted of single manufacturer, retailer and third-party recycler, the paper builds decision models for the emissions reduction rate, the recovery rate and price under the situation of the non-cooperation, incomplete-cooperation (the emission reduction cost-sharing contract and bargaining), full-cooperation, and carries out comparative analysis. The results show that, in general, when the full-cooperation achieves the highest level of emission reduction and recovery and the lowest retail price, it also achieves the highest joint profit and emission reduction utility; for two kinds of incomplete-cooperation, except for the manufacturer′s profits, the emission reduction level, the recycling level, the wholesale price, the retail price，the retailer′s profit, the joint supply chain profit, the third party′s profit and the emission reduction utility in the emission reduction bargaining are better than in the emission reduction cost-sharing. In reality, the most ideal model of full-cooperation emission reduction is difficult to reach. Therefore, government should take measures to promote two kinds of cooperative emission reduction ways.

Key words: cooperation, emission reduction, closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game

李辉1，汪传旭1，欧卫2. 闭环供应链企业合作减排与定价策略[J]. 商业研究.

LI Hui1, WANG Chuan-xu1, OU Wei2. Pricing and Cooperation Strategy of Enterprises′ Carbon Emission Reduction in Closed-loop Supply Chain[J]. 商业研究.

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