商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

中间品区别定价行为的竞争效应与反垄断规制 ——基于讨价还价理论的分析

喻言1，任剑新2，田苗3   

  1. 1. 湖南农业大学 经济学院，长沙 410128；2.中南财经政法大学 工商管理学院， 武汉 430070；3.肇庆学院 经济与管理学院，广东 肇庆 526000
  • 收稿日期:2017-01-29 出版日期:2017-05-25
  • 作者简介:喻言（1980-），女，武汉人，湖南农业大学经济学院讲师，经济学博士，研究方向：产业组织理论与反垄断经济学；任剑新（1967-），男，湖北荆州人，中南财经政法大学工商管理学院教授，经济学博士，研究方向：产业组织理论与反垄断经济学；田苗（1981-），女，辽宁铁岭人，肇庆学院经济与管理学院副教授，经济学博士，研究方向：生态经济。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金青年项目，项目编号：15CJY001；湖南省社科基金项目，项目编号：14YBA203；湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目资助；湖南省社科成果评审委员会课题，项目编号：XSP17YBZC086。

Competitive Effect of Price Discrimination in Intermediate Market and Antitrust Regulation——An Analysis based on Bargaining Theory

YU Yan1，REN Jian-xin2，TIAN Miao3   

  1. 1. School of Economics, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128,China;2.School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430070,China; 3.School of Economics and Management, Zhaoqing University, Zhaoqing 526000,China
  • Received:2017-01-29 Online:2017-05-25

摘要： 随着整个产业链的主导权逐渐由上游厂商向下游厂商转移，下游厂商对市场控制能力不断上升，所具有的讨价还价能力也不断增强，进而导致上游厂商对中间品实行区别定价，并对下游弱势厂商产生“水床效应”。本文以上游垄断-下游寡头的市场结构为基准，在上下游厂商都具有一定讨价还价能力的情形下分析中间品区别定价的竞争效应。结果表明，当上游厂商选择讨价还价能力强的下游厂商进行统一定价协商时，统一定价时的消费者福利高于区别定价情形；当上游厂商选择讨价还价能力弱的下游厂商进行统一定价协商时，统一定价时的消费者福利低于区别定价情形；不论上游厂商选择强势或弱势下游厂商进行价格协商，统一定价时下游厂商的利润和社会总福利总是高于区别定价情形。因此，对中间品区别定价行为的反垄断规制应考虑到上下游厂商的讨价还价能力，应将“市场支配地位”标准延伸至“相对经济优势”。

关键词: 中间品市场, 区别定价, 统一定价, 讨价还价

Abstract: With the dominance of whole industry chain gradually transferred from upstream manufacturers to downstream manufacturers, downstream manufacturers′ ability to control the market is rising continually, so downstream manufacturers′ bargaining power is also growing, which will lead to the price discrimination in the intermediate market by upstream manufacturers, and have “waterbed effect” on other downstream firms. Based on the perspective of bargaining theory and the market structure of upstream monopoly-downstream oligopoly, the article analyzes the competitive effect of price discrimination in intermediate market under the circumstances of both upstream and downstream firms having some bargaining power. The results show that when the upstream firms choose the downstream firms with strong bargaining power to carry out a unified pricing negotiation, consumers′ welfare under uniform pricing is higher than that under price discrimination; when upstream firms choose the downstream firms with lower bargaining power to carry out a unified pricing negotiation, consumers′ welfare under uniform pricing is lower than that under price discrimination; regardless of the upstream manufacturers choosing strong or weak downstream manufacturers to carry out price negotiation, downstream manufacturers′ profits and total social welfare under unified pricing are always higher than those under price discrimination situation. Therefore, the article concludes that the antitrust regulation of price discrimination in the intermediate market should take into account upstream and downstream manufacturers′ bargaining power and extend the “market dominance” standard to the “relative economic advantage”.

Key words: intermediate market, price discrimination, uniform pricing, bargaining