商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

控股股东股权质押、股权性质与公司绩效研究

林艳，魏连宾，李炜   

  1. （东北农业大学 经济管理学院，哈尔滨 150030）
  • 收稿日期:2017-08-24 出版日期:2018-02-22
  • 作者简介:林艳（1963-），女，黑龙江青冈人，东北农业大学经济管理学院教授，研究方向：会计理论与实务；魏连宾（1993-），女，天津人，东北农业大学经济管理学院研究生，研究方向：会计理论与实务；李炜（1976-），本文通讯作者，女，黑龙江绥化人，东北农业大学经济管理学院讲师，研究方向：会计理论与资本市场。
  • 基金资助:
    黑龙江省社科基金项目，项目编号：14B009。

Research on Controlling Shareholder′s Equity Pledge, Equity Nature and Corporate Performance

LIN Yan,WEI Lian-bin,LI Wei   

  1. (School of Management, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin 150030, China)
  • Received:2017-08-24 Online:2018-02-22

摘要： 融资需求是上市公司运行面临的重要问题，在银行信贷和大股东减持受到限制、资本市场并不活跃的情况下，股权质押以其独有的灵活性、轻资产性成为上市公司控股股东缓解融资约束的首选方式。本文实证分析2011-2015年沪深两市上市公司控股股东股权质押对公司绩效产生的影响，发现民营上市公司控股股东比国有上市公司控股股东更倾向于股权质押；控股股东的持股比例与股权质押呈负相关关系，并受到股权性质的影响，民营上市公司控股股东“对赌”意愿更加强烈，负相关关系更为显著；控股股东股权质押与公司绩效呈正向相关，这种相关性会因为股权性质不同有明显差异。

关键词: 控股股东, 股权性质, 股权质押, 公司绩效

Abstract: Financing needs is an important problem of each listed company. When bank credit and major shareholder reduction are limited, capital market is not active, so the equity pledge with its unique flexibility, light assets becomes a preferred way for the controlling shareholder to ease financing constraint. This paper studies the impact of the equity pledge of controlling shareholder of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen on the performance of the company from 2011 to 2015. The empirical results show that the controlling shareholder of private listed company is more likely to equity pledge than the controlling shareholder of the state-owned listed company; the controlling shareholder′s shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with equity pledge and is affected by equity nature, the controlling shareholder of private listed company is more willing to bet on gambling,leading to more significant negative correlation; the equity pledge of controlling shareholder is positively related to the performance of the company, and the relationship will be obviously different because of the different nature of the equity.

Key words: controlling shareholder, equity nature, equity pledge, corporate performance