商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

国企高管政治动机、会计稳健性与投资效率 ——基于反腐风暴背景的实证分析

王丽娟,曹亚男   

  1. (江南大学 商学院,江苏 无锡 214122)
  • 收稿日期:2017-12-16 出版日期:2018-05-22
  • 作者简介:王丽娟(1962-),女,江苏常州人,江南大学商学院教授,研究方向:财务管理;曹亚男(1994-),女,江苏南通人,江南大学商学院研究生,研究方向:财务管理。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社科青年基金项目“流动性视角下股价惯性研究——基于国家治理能力的现代化推进”,项目编号:17YJC790008。

Political Incentive of SOEs, Accounting Conservatism and Investment Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis based on the Anti-corruption Storm

WANG Li-juan, CAO Ya-nan   

  1. (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China)
  • Received:2017-12-16 Online:2018-05-22

摘要: 我国国企高管的行政色彩使其具有鲜明的政治动机,从而影响企业的投资决策和投资效率。本文以我国国企A股上市公司2007-2016年数据为研究对象,对国企高管政治动机、会计稳健性与投资效率的关系进行实证分析。研究结果表明:在反腐风暴前,国企高管“急于求成”动机引致了投资过度,反腐风暴后国企高管“不作为”的动机导致了投资不足;会计稳健性缓解了国企高管“不作为”动机对投资不足的影响,但对国企高管“急于求成”动机与投资过度间的调节作用并不显著。上述结论丰富了国企高管政治动机影响因素的相关研究,为反腐风暴后国有企业的资源配置优化及长远发展提供理论参考。

关键词: 反腐, 政治动机, 会计稳健性, 投资效率

Abstract: The administrative color of SOEs in China has a distinct political motivation, which affects the investment decision-making and investment efficiency of enterprises. Based on the data of A-share listed companies of China from 2007 to 2016, this paper carries out empirical analysis of the relationship between the political incentive of SOEs, accounting conservatism and investment efficiency. Research shows that before (after) the anti-corruption storm, SOEs tend to be more aggressive (defensive), leading to more severe over-investment (under-investment); accounting conservatism alleviates the influence of executives′ omission motivation on underinvestment, but the moderating effect on the over-investment caused by SOEs′ aggressive trend is not significant. The research of this paper enriches the relevant literatures on the influence factors of the political incentives of the SOEs, and provides theoretical reference for resource allocation optimization and long-term development of state-owned enterprises after the anti-corruption storm.

Key words: anti-corruption, political incentive, accounting conservatism, investment efficiency