商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

内部控制缺陷定量认定标准与内部控制审计定价

张俊民1,芦雅婷1,2,傅绍正1   

  1. (1.天津财经大学 商学院,天津 300222;2. 唐山学院 会计系,河北 唐山 063000)
  • 收稿日期:2018-03-07 出版日期:2018-07-16
  • 作者简介:张俊民(1960-),男,山东鱼台人,天津财经大学商学院教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,研究方向:会计监管、审计质量与内部控制;芦雅婷(1984-),女,武汉人,天津财经大学商学院博士研究生,唐山学院会计系讲师,研究方向:审计理论与内部控制;傅绍正(1989-),男,山东临朐人,天津财经大学商学院讲师,管理学博士,研究方向:审计理论与内部控制。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目,项目编号:71272189;国家自然科学基金青年项目,项目编号:71502122。

Quantitative Internal Control Weakness Identification Standards and Internal Control Audit Pricing

ZHANG Jun-min1,LU Ya-ting1,2,FU Shao-zheng1   

  1. (1. School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China; 2. Department of Accounting, Tangshan University, Tangshan 063000, China)
  • Received:2018-03-07 Online:2018-07-16

摘要: 基于信号揭示理论,本文以2012-2016年沪深A股单独披露内控审计费用的上市公司为研究对象,考察内控缺陷定量认定标准对内控审计定价的影响及其作用路径。实证结果发现上市公司自由裁量的认定标准宽严程度与内控审计定价显著正相关,但与反映内控审计投入的审计延迟无显著关系,这表明认定标准越严格,审计师通过收取风险溢价这一路径来降低风险,而非增加努力程度;审计师对严格的权益类认定标准更为敏感,良好的控制环境对认定标准宽严程度与内控审计定价之间的关系具有正向调节作用。上述结论不仅为认定标准的经济后果研究提供了新的经验证据,而且有助于理解认定标准对内控审计定价的影响。

关键词: 缺陷定量认定标准, 内部控制审计定价, 信号揭示, 内部控制审计延迟, 风险溢价

Abstract: Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies that disclosed the internal control audit fees in 2012-2016 as the research objects, this paper investigates the effect of quantitative internal control weakness identification standards on internal control audit pricing and its action path based on signaling theory. The result shows that,there is a positive relationship between strict identification standards at the discretion of the listed companies and internal control audit pricing, however, there is no significant association between strict identification standards and internal control audit delay which is a proxy of internal control audit engagement.The results demonstrate when quantitative internal control weakness identification standards are stricter, auditors will collect risk premium but not increase audit effort to reduce the risk; auditors are more sensitive to strict standards of equity, and good control environment can moderate the effect of identification standards on audit pricing. The conclusion of this study not only provides new evidence for the economic consequences of quantitative internal control weakness identification standards, but also helps to understand the influence of identification standards on internal control audit pricing.

Key words: quantitative internal control weakness identification standards, internal control audit pricing, signaling, internal control audit delay, risk premium