商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管声誉对企业R&D投资的双重效应 ——基于高管薪酬中介作用的路径分析

徐宁，王雪凝，张阳   

  1. （山东大学 管理学院，济南 250100）
  • 收稿日期:2018-02-27 出版日期:2018-07-16
  • 作者简介:徐宁（1982-），女，济南人，山东大学管理学院副教授，管理学博士，研究方向：公司治理；王雪凝（1994-），女，山东聊城人，山东大学管理学院研究生，研究方向：公司治理；张阳（1993-），女，山东莱芜人，山东大学管理学院研究生，研究方向：公司治理。
  • 基金资助:
    山东省自然科学基金面上项目“上市公司高管声誉对技术创新战略决策的作用机制”，项目编号；ZR2018MG007；山东省社科基金面上项目“薪酬管制背景下山东省国企高管声誉的治理效用及实现机制研究”，项目编号：18CGLJ01；山东大学青年学者未来计划项目“中国情境下高管隐性激励契约的价值创造效应研究”，项目编号：2017WLJH44。

The Dual Effects of Executive Reputation on R&D Investment: A Path Analysis based on the Mediating Effect of Executive Compensation

XU Ning, WANG Xue-ning, ZHANG Yang   

  1. (School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China）
  • Received:2018-02-27 Online:2018-07-16

摘要： 作为具有双重效应的公司治理契约，良好的高管声誉究竟是推进企业技术创新的动力还是抑制创新的桎梏？本文运用2007-2016年中国上市公司的平衡面板数据，采用Edwards和Lambert提出的调节路径分析方法，实证检验高管声誉与R&D投资之间的非线性关系及高管薪酬的中介效应。研究表明：高管声誉与R&D投资之间具有显著的倒U型关系，在高管声誉水平达到最优值之前，高管声誉对R&D投资会产生正向影响，但超过该最优值则会演变为负向影响；高管声誉通过倒U型曲线效应影响高管薪酬，进而影响R&D投资，促成高管声誉与R&D投资之间的倒U型关系，即高管薪酬在高管声誉与R&D投资的关系中间起到中介传导作用。

关键词: 高管声誉, 高管薪酬, R&D投资, 非线性关系, 路径分析

Abstract: As a governance contract with double effects, is good executive reputation a driving force for technological innovation or the shackles of innovation? The paper uses the moderating path analytic technique put forward by Edwards and Lambert to test the non-linear relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment and the mediating effect of executive compensation, by using the balanced panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016. The research shows that there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between senior management reputation and R&D investment, that is, the executives reputation will have a positive impact on R&D investment before executive reputation reaches the optimal level, but exceeding this optimum level, it will evolve into negative influence; executive reputation has an obvious effect on executive compensation by inverted U-curve effect, which in turn promotes the inverted U-type relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment, that is, executive compensation plays an intermediary role in the relationship between executive reputation and R&D investment.

Key words: executive reputation, executive compensation, R&D investment, non-linear relationship, path analysis