商业研究

商业研究

• 商经理论 • 上一篇    下一篇

股权激励与企业技术资本投资 ——基于倾向得分匹配法（PSM）的实证分析

孙菁1，鹿瑶2   

  1. （1.青岛大学 商学院，山东 青岛 266061；2.齐鲁工业大学 工商管理学院，济南 250353）
  • 收稿日期:2018-04-12 出版日期:2018-10-10
  • 作者简介:孙菁（1989-），女，山东青岛人，青岛大学商学院讲师，管理学博士，研究方向：技术创新与公司治理；鹿瑶（1994-），本文通讯作者，女，山东高密人，齐鲁工业大学工商管理学院研究生，研究方向：财务理论与技术资本。
  • 基金资助:
    中国博士后基金项目，项目编号：2017M611575；教育部人文社会科学研究项目，项目编号：18YJC630152。

Equity Incentives and Corporate Technology Capital Investment:An Empirical Analysis based on Propensity Score Matching (PSM)

SUN Jing1, LU Yao2   

  1. (1.School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266061, China; 2. School of Business Administration, Qilu University of Technology, Jinan 250353, China)
  • Received:2018-04-12 Online:2018-10-10

摘要： 在我国经济由高速增长向高质量发展转换的背景下，技术资本成为影响国民经济增长和企业创新绩效的重要因素，而作为企业治理机制安排的股权激励计划对企业技术资本投资，进而对实现企业价值最大化产生重要影响。本文以2008-2014年沪深两地上市公司为研究样本，利用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）考察股权激励对上市公司技术资本投资的影响，发现股权激励计划的实施从整体上对上市公司技术资本投资具有促进作用，非国有企业技术资本投资对股权激励的敏感性显著高于国有企业；股权激励能够缓解非国有企业的代理冲突，促进非国有企业技术资本投资的增加，但股权激励仅对我国东部地区及中等规模企业的技术资本投资具有显著的促进作用。

关键词: 股权激励, 技术资本投资, 代理冲突, 倾向得分匹配

Abstract: Under the background of China′s economic transition from high-speed growth to high-quality development, technology capital has become an important factor that affecting national economic growth and corporate innovation performance. As an arrangement of corporate governance mechanism, equity incentive plan has an important impact on the investment of technological capital and the maximization of enterprise value. This paper takes the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2008-2014 as research samples, and uses the propensity score matching method (PSM) to investigate the impact of equity incentives on listed company′s technology capital investment. The results show that the implementation of the equity incentive plan can promote the technology capital investment of listed companies as a whole, and the sensitivity of technology capital investment of non-state-owned enterprises to equity incentive is significantly higher than that of state-owned enterprises; equity incentives can alleviate the agency conflicts of non-state-owned enterprises and promote the increase of technology capital investment of non-state-owned enterprises,however, equity incentives only have a significant role in promoting technological capital investment in eastern China and medium-sized enterprises.

Key words: equity incentive, technology capital investment, agency conflict, propensity score matching