商业研究

商业研究

• 公司治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

非国有股东治理与国企分红 ——兼论混合所有制改革

洪正，袁齐   

  1. （西南财经大学 中国金融研究中心，成都 611130）
  • 收稿日期:2018-08-31 出版日期:2019-01-17
  • 作者简介:洪正（1971-），男，安徽无为人，西南财经大学中国金融研究中心教授，博士生导师，经济学博士，研究方向：公司金融、银行理论；袁齐（1987-），男，山东泰安人，西南财经大学中国金融研究中心博士研究生，研究方向：公司金融。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重点项目，项目编号：17AJY029；研究阐释党的十九大精神国家社科基金专项，项目编号：18VSJ073。

Non-State-owned Shareholder Governance and Dividends of State-owned Enterprises: A Study of Mixed Ownership Reform

HONG Zheng，YUAN Qi   

  1. (Institute of Chinese Financial Studies, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China)
  • Received:2018-08-31 Online:2019-01-17

摘要： 国有企业缺乏有效的分工动机已成为国企改革中一直未能有效克服的顽疾，而国企混合所有制改革对公司的治理绩效的提升无疑会起到积极的作用，其中能否改善公司的财务政策、提升公司的分红动机？本文以2008-2014年的国有上市公司数据为样本，利用手工收集的非国有股东持股比例和委派高管人员比例，检验非国有股东治理对国企分红的影响及作用机制。结果表明，非国有股东治理能够显著地提升国企分红的倾向和水平，该结论在控制了内生性后依然成立；同时非国有股东治理对国企分红的提升效应是通过降低国有企业内部代理成本实现的。进一步研究还表明，良好的法律环境和竞争性行业特征能够对上述影响产生正向的调节作用。本文的研究从非国有股东治理的角度，为混合所有制改革的经济效果提供了一定的证据支持。

关键词: 非国有股东, 国企分红, 混合所有制改革, 公司治理

Abstract: Lack of effective motivation for division of labor in state-owned enterprises has become a persistent problem that has not been effectively overcome in the reform of state-owned enterprises. Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises will undoubtedly play a positive role in improving corporate governance performance,which can improve the company′s financial policy and enhance the company′s dividend motivation? Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2014, this paper examines the impact and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders′ governance on dividends of state-owned enterprises by using the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders and the proportion of senior executives from non-state-owned shareholders collected by hand. The results show that the non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly improve the tendency and level of dividends of state-owned enterprises,and this conclusion is still established after controlling endogeneity; at the same time, the effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the dividend of state-owned enterprises is realized by reducing the internal agency costs of state-owned enterprises. In addition, further research has shown that a good legal environment and competitive industry characteristics can positively regulate these effects. The research of this paper provides some evidence support for the economic effects of mixed ownership reform from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders′ governance.

Key words: non-state-owned shareholders, dividends of state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership reform, corporate governance