LUO Meng-ni. The Mixed Ownership, Corporate Governance Quality and Equity Capital Cost:
An Analysis based on Empirical Evidence from China′s Capital Market[J]. 商业研究.
注释:
①学术界公认的有关“资本成本”的定义出自《新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典》,即资本成本是商业资产的投资者要求获得的预期收益率。
②“可预期效应”是指政府干预与企业经营环境和经验风险面临的可预期程度呈反比关系,即政府减少干预将提高企业在经营活动中的灵活性和可应对性,将降低信息的不对称性,提升企业股权资本成本估算的准确性和可预测性。
③“保护效应”是指降低政府干预会减少政府对企业经营活动的庇护效应,缺少了政府的庇佑会增加股东、尤其是中小股东对企业风险的评价。
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