Abstract: Heterogeneity of tenure of top management team leads to value goal difference between managers, and tenure heterogeneity of the chairman and CEO can alleviate the agency problem and avoid the happening of ineffective investment. From the perspective of stock price crash risk, the paper inspects the influence of tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO on corporate governance, and compares the strength of its governance effect in the different situations. Research finds that tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO can inhibit stock price crash risk and major shareholders holdings will affect the relation between tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO and stock price crash risk; when the major shareholders holdings is high, the relation between tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO and stock price crash risk is not significant; when the major shareholders holdings is low, tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO has great inhibitory effect on stock price crash risk, which is significant in state-owned enterprises, but is not remarkable in the privately owned enterprises. This suggests that tenure heterogeneity of chairman and CEO has a positive role in governance, but its role has context effect.

Key words: chairman, CEO, tenure heterogeneity, stock price crash risk, corporate governance