Abstract: Based on the purpose of stimulating the initiative and enthusiasm of FDI enterprises environmental innovation behavior, by analyzing the profit and rights of stakeholders participating in the environmental innovation behavior of FDI enterprises in the social systems, the tripartite evolutionary game model including the host government，FDI enterprises and parent company is built. System dynamics theory is introduced to construct the SD evolutionary game model and make related analysis by assigning values. The results show: the three parties all get the stable state by constantly adjusting their strategies according to the profits;the environmental regulation of host country and cross-border environmental management of parent company are not the determinants for implementing environmental behavior of FDI enterprises;different regulation intensity have different effects on the possibility of FDI enterprises′ environmental innovation behavior;highly centralized and unified cross-border environmental management strategy may reduce the risk of subsidiary′s bad environmental behavior, but inhibit the environmental innovation behavior at the same time. The policy implications of the above conclusions are that innovation cost and profit are the enterprises′ motive of implementing environmental innovation behavior and the foothold of stakeholders′ regulation and management.

Key words: FDI enterprises environmental innovation behavior, environmental regulation, cross-border environmental management, evolutionary game, system dynamics