Abstract: The choice of CFO in family-controlled listed companies significantly contributes to internal principal-agent problem and corporate financial performance. This paper selects family-controlled A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as samples to conduct empirical analysis of CFO background characteristics and corporate performance within the framework of principal-agent theory. Results show that the actual controllers of family-controlled listed companies are more likely to choose CFO from internal source based on higher degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights; CFO from whether internal or external sources, has no significant difference in financial performance and excess sales management expenses, but the actual controller′s participation can significantly improve CFO′s positive impact on company performance; gender attributes of CFO put a significant impact on excess sales charges, and female CFO from external source can ease the principal-agent problem. The inspiration of this paper is that the principal agent problem of the private enterprise CFO has no substantial influence on the source background of CFO, but is related to the personal characteristics of the CFO.

Key words: CFO in family-controlled listed companies, corporate performance, internal principal-agent problem