Abstract: The dual attribute of “economic man” and “politician man” of SOEs′ senior executives make their personal motivations be more complicated during investment deciding. This paper mixes two different self-knowledge explanations from“agency theory” and “stewardship theory” for SOEs′ senior executives, and then makes theoretical and empirical analysis of investment governance effect of SOEs′ party organization under the situation of “strict administration of the Party ”. This paper finds that party organization′s governance participation could promote SOEs′ investment efficiency, and have positive effect on investment governance, including reducing Over-investment and promoting the ability of capturing investment chances; this kind of effect mainly exists in central enterprises, while it is still insignificant in local state-owned enterprises. However, whether it is in theory or in practice, in the process of state-owned enterprises promoting the internal party organizations into corporate governance level, we should ensure the construction of long-term mechanism of “strict admimstration of the party”.

Key words: state-owned enterprise, party organization′s governance participation, investment governance, strict administration of the party