Abstract: Alliance of high-tech start-ups and incubators played an important role in steady and rapid growth of China′s entrepreneurial enterprises. This paper was targeted to building alliance of high-tech start-ups and incubators under the condition of bilateral moral hazard. First of all, the general income distribution matrix of incubation services trading and cooperation game was constructed to analyze the characteristics of focal point equilibrium and moderation equilibrium. And then, income transfer and non-cooperation predetermined precept were introduced to the alliance contract design. Meanwhile, their function mechanisms on player′s income distribution were also empirically tested. It was found that focal point equilibrium allowed one side to enjoy alone, so it would be harmful to the alliance′s development; in addition, the moderation equilibrium was best for the entrepreneur, but bad for the incubator, therefore it lacked impartiality; two new equilibriums under the condition of income transfer and non-cooperation predetermined precept both showed an advantage over the moderation equilibrium, but their efficiencies for high-tech start-ups were in a descendant manner. The root was the type of non-cooperation action before the time of the alliance. The richer the type, the higher the share of earnings in the trading and cooperation equilibrium after the time of the alliance.Therefore, in order to inhibit each other′s opportunistic behaviors and strengthen alliance, the corresponding cooperation constraints and contract design countermeasures were finally given for high-tech start-ups and incubators respectively.

Key words: bilateral moral hazard, high-tech start-ups, technology business incubators, venture alliance, cooperation agreement, income distribution