Abstract: The administrative color of SOEs in China has a distinct political motivation, which affects the investment decision-making and investment efficiency of enterprises. Based on the data of A-share listed companies of China from 2007 to 2016, this paper carries out empirical analysis of the relationship between the political incentive of SOEs, accounting conservatism and investment efficiency. Research shows that before (after) the anti-corruption storm, SOEs tend to be more aggressive (defensive), leading to more severe over-investment (under-investment); accounting conservatism alleviates the influence of executives′ omission motivation on underinvestment, but the moderating effect on the over-investment caused by SOEs′ aggressive trend is not significant. The research of this paper enriches the relevant literatures on the influence factors of the political incentives of the SOEs, and provides theoretical reference for resource allocation optimization and long-term development of state-owned enterprises after the anti-corruption storm.

Key words: anti-corruption, political incentive, accounting conservatism, investment efficiency