Abstract: Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies that disclosed the internal control audit fees in 2012-2016 as the research objects, this paper investigates the effect of quantitative internal control weakness identification standards on internal control audit pricing and its action path based on signaling theory. The result shows that，there is a positive relationship between strict identification standards at the discretion of the listed companies and internal control audit pricing, however, there is no significant association between strict identification standards and internal control audit delay which is a proxy of internal control audit engagement．The results demonstrate when quantitative internal control weakness identification standards are stricter, auditors will collect risk premium but not increase audit effort to reduce the risk; auditors are more sensitive to strict standards of equity, and good control environment can moderate the effect of identification standards on audit pricing. The conclusion of this study not only provides new evidence for the economic consequences of quantitative internal control weakness identification standards, but also helps to understand the influence of identification standards on internal control audit pricing.

Key words: quantitative internal control weakness identification standards, internal control audit pricing, signaling, internal control audit delay, risk premium