Abstract: The online shopping food supply chain has a large information asymmetry, while signal transmission is an effective way to eliminate information asymmetry. Based on the signal-passion game theory, this paper constructs the signal game model of online shopping food supply chain platform and platform sellers, and analyzes the equilibrium results. The results show that only the separation and equalization can achieve the separation of the advantages and disadvantages of the platform sellers, so that the high-quality sellers choose transmit signals to the platform, inferior sellers don′t choose transmit signals, and the key to avoiding the market entering mixed equilibrium and quasi-separation equilibrium is to increase the probability of the platform identifying inferior sellers. To this end, high-quality platform sellers should enhance the transmission of their brands and high-quality signals, and build food traceability mechanisms with other entities in the supply chain; online shopping food supply chain platforms should improve their signal detection and identification mechanisms, build sellers′ food safety credit files, and increase reward for high-quality sellers, penalties for inferior sellers; government should strengthen daily supervision and establish a “total + point” management model with the online shopping food supply chain platform.

Key words: online shopping food supply chain, platform, platform seller, signal transmission game