商业研究

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Can Institutional Investors′ Shareholding Inhibit High-leverage Mergers and Acquisitions of State-owned Enterprises?

ZHOU Shao-ni1, WANG Yan1, SONG Meng-ya2   

  1. (1.School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044,China; 2. School of International Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029,China)
  • Received:2018-04-27 Online:2018-10-10

Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions (Hereinafter referred to as M&A) behavior as a major production and operation decision of the enterprise, the role of heterogeneous institutional investors needs to be further inspected. This paper selects a sample of state-owned enterprises(Hereinafter referred to as SOEs)′ M&A to examine the impact of heterogeneous institutional investor shareholders on the high-leverage SOEs′ M&A behavior. The results show that institutional investors can significantly inhibit the possibility of high-leverage M&A, but stable institutional investors cann′t significantly inhibit the possibility of high-leverage M&A; institutional investors can significantly inhibit the size of M&A by high-leverage enterprises, and the shareholding level of large shareholders and the correlation of M&A can reduce the above-mentioned inhibition, while the impact of stable institutional investors on the size of M&A of high-leverage enterprises shows better stability. Therefore, stable institutional investors can influence the scale of M&A more effectively through enterprises internal decisions than all institutional investors.

Key words: institutional investors, SOEs′ M&A, leverage level