Abstract: Lack of effective motivation for division of labor in state-owned enterprises has become a persistent problem that has not been effectively overcome in the reform of state-owned enterprises. Mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises will undoubtedly play a positive role in improving corporate governance performance,which can improve the company′s financial policy and enhance the company′s dividend motivation? Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2014, this paper examines the impact and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders′ governance on dividends of state-owned enterprises by using the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders and the proportion of senior executives from non-state-owned shareholders collected by hand. The results show that the non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly improve the tendency and level of dividends of state-owned enterprises,and this conclusion is still established after controlling endogeneity; at the same time, the effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the dividend of state-owned enterprises is realized by reducing the internal agency costs of state-owned enterprises. In addition, further research has shown that a good legal environment and competitive industry characteristics can positively regulate these effects. The research of this paper provides some evidence support for the economic effects of mixed ownership reform from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders′ governance.

Key words: non-state-owned shareholders, dividends of state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership reform, corporate governance