Abstract: This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of retailers, manufacturers and government departments for retailers to recycle and manufacturers to deal with expired foods, and the combination of the stable equilibrium strategies under different parameter values is obtained, and the numerical simulation is used to visually analyze the different stable points of the three-party game. The result shows that the comparison of ′cost′ and ′revenue′ related to expired food recycling and regulation among retailers, manufacturers and government departments lead to four different evolutionary stability strategies combinations for retailers and government departments, i.e. (no recycling, no regulation), (no recycling, regulation), (recycling, no regulation) and (recycling, regulation), and three different evolutionary stability strategies combinations between manufacturers and government departments, i.e. (informal processing, no regulation), (informal processing, regulation) and (formal processing, regulation). According to this, “opportunity gains” such as the comprehensive income of retailers and manufacturers for regular recycling of expired foods should be increased, and various “opportunity costs” for regular recycling of expired foods should be reduced, and government departments also need to pay attention to the control of the formal recycling of discarded foods such as expired foods, and use it as one of the main contents of the food safety supervision work of government departments.

Key words: expired food, recycling and dealing with, regulation, three-party evolution game