Abstract: Longitudinal concurrent executives are ubiquitous in listed companies in China, which has an important direct impact on corporate financial management and decision-making.In theory, the impact of the longitudinal concurrent executives on the collapse of the company′s stock price is bidirectional, with both “supervisory effect” and “embezzlement effect”. Which effect is the most important?Based on principal-agent theory, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as samples. Empirical tests show that companies with longitudinal concurrent executives have higher risk of stock price crash,and longitudinal concurrent executives increase the risk of stock price crash by intensifying the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, which supports the “embezzlement effect” hypothesis;further research finds that when the controlling power of major shareholders is weaker(the proportion of major shareholders is low),and the internal and external supervision mechanism is poorer(single major shareholders, the number of independent directors is small, the proportion of institutional investors is low, and the legal environment is poor), the risk of stock price crash is higher, which logically provides further evidence for the hypothesis of “embezzlement effect” of longitudinal concurrent executives. This paper expands and innovates the related research on longitudinal concurrent executives, and enriches and develops the related research in the field of stock price crash risk..

Key words: longitudinal concurrent executives, stock price crash risk, large shareholders, embezzlement effect, supervision effect