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The Inhibition Effect of Performance Expectation Gap on Executive′s Excess Pay: A Test based on Different Expected Reference Standards

SHAO Jian-bing, CAO Zhan-fei   

  1. (Business School of Liaoning University, Shenyang 110036,China)
  • Received:2019-05-10 Online:2019-10-16

Abstract: Abstract:Based on the data of 2009-2017, this paper explores the impact of performance expectation gap on executive excess pay. Among them, industry and history under the two reference standards of expectation gap on the intensity of excess compensation is different, the former is stronger than the latter;under the industry reference standard, the inhibition effect of industry expectation gap on executive excess pay does not change because of executive power,and under the historical reference standard, the inhibition effect on executive excess pay is no longer significant when executive power is strong. The above results are still valid after considering the persistence and scope of expectation gap. Because the industry expectation gap under the industry reference standard has a stronger inhibition on the excess compensation of senior executives, and the influence of senior executives power is not obvious, the priority of industry performance expectation in the formulation of senior executives′ compensation can better meet the requirements of stakeholders.

Key words: historical expectation gap, industry expectation gap, executive over pay, executive power