Abstract: Under the background of financial repression, Chinese enterprises are still in a quasi monopoly credit market in which capital supply is in short supply. The rent-seeking behavior of enterprises to obtain credit resources has become the implicit capital cost of enterprises.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2013, this paper empirically analyzes the implicit capital cost and resource allocation efficiency in bank credit decision-making.The results show that the rent-seeking activity of enterprises is a implicit capital cost in the process of bank loan allocation. Whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, the rent-seeking activity of enterprises can help to obtain more bank loans, but its efficiency is very different.Specifically, restricted by the resource endowment of the enterprise itself, the bank loan obtained by the state-owned enterprise through rent-seeking reduces the investment efficiency, while the bank loan obtained by the private enterprise through rent-seeking improves the investment efficiency.The conclusion shows that financial repression hinders the transaction through explicit contract, and corporate rent-seeking becomes a recessive contract in bank credit decision-making. This recessive contract is not an effective supplement to explicit contract, and even leads to a high leverage ratio of some enterprises, which will damage the effective allocation of resources.

Key words: implicit capital cost, enterprise rent-seeking, bank loan, investment efficiency