Abstract: Abstract：Although enterprises can reduce competition through Mergers and Acquisitions(M&A), different dominant structure of enterprises in supply chain may lead to M&A can not give full play to its market advantage. Based on the supply chain composed of two differentiated competitive manufacturers and one retailer, in the market competition and market M&A situation, this paper constructs the supply chain game model dominated by each manufacturer and retailer respectively, and investigates the market M&A strategy of differentiated competitive manufacturers and the impact of different dominant structure on M&A value.The results show that: in different situations, the member enterprises in the leading position of the supply chain can always obtain more profits through the implementation of high price strategy;the market M&A strategy of differentiated competitive manufacturers can effectively improve the profit level of supply-side enterprises, but it will also lead to the negative impact of double marginal effects on retailers and supply chain system, and reduce the total demand of products;when the manufacturer has the dominant power, it has greater motivation to implement M&A strategy, while the retailer in the dominant position can alleviate the adverse impact of upstream monopoly on the supply chain.

Key words: Key words：Mergers and Acquisitions;power structure, competitive differentiation, pricing