Abstract: Abstract：Under the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom′s multi task principal-agent model, this paper establishes a three task model of state-owned enterprises, and discusses the executive incentive issues related to the multi task effort cost of state-owned enterprises.It is found that when the multi-task is complementary, the realization of corporate social responsibility goal will promote the economic task, which is conducive to the realization of economic task goal. Increasing the task incentive with high observability will lead to the improvement of complementary task performance.When multi-task is the substitute, the realization of corporate social responsibility will hinder the realization of corporate economic task, which is not conducive to the realization of economic task,while increasing task motivation with high observability will reduce the performance of complementary tasks.When the multi- task is not related, the effort cost between tasks is independent of each other. To realize the policy task is not related to the effort cost of other tasks, the policy task should be separated.This conclusion has important reference value for the task selection and assignment of state-owned enterprises, as well as the incentive mechanism design when there are multiple tasks.

Key words: Key words：state owned enterprises, principal-agent, incentive mechanism, multi-task model, effort cost correlation