Abstract: In order to make up for the lack of rational economic man hypothesis or single preference in supply chain, the paper establishes a supply chain game model with complete self-interest and social preference (only retailers have social preference, only manufacturer has social preference, and both sides have social preference) based on wholesale price contract, and analyzes the influence of social preference of decision-makers on pricing strategy, carbon emission reduction strategy, optimal order quantity, profit of decision-making body and profit and coordination of supply chain.The results show that: the increase of altruistic preference of both sides can stimulate manufacturers to invest in emission reduction; the altruistic behavior of leader manufacturer is beneficial to slow down the “double marginal utility” of supply chain, while the influence of altruistic behavior of follower retailer on supply chain profit is related to manufacturer′s social preference;when the reciprocal preference plays a leading role and considers that the other party has unfriendly behavior, the reciprocal preference will reduce the manufacturer′s enthusiasm for emission reduction and aggravate the “double marginal utility” of the supply chain. These conclusions extend the theory of supply chain management, and provide a reference for low-carbon supply chain node enterprises to choose the type of partners and low-carbon supply chain operation.

Key words: altruistic preference, reciprocal preference, low-carbon supply chain, carbon emission reduction, supply chain coordination