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Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling Subsidy Strategy of New Energy Vehicle Power Battery: An Analysis based on Evolutionary Games

QIU Ze-guo,ZHENG Yi,XU Yao-qun   

  1. (School of Computer and Information Engineering, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, China)
  • Received:2020-05-22 Online:2020-08-20

Abstract: If the power battery that reaches the service life cannot be effectively recycled, it will cause economic losses and cause serious environmental problems. Based on the evolutionary games method, this paper analyzes the power battery recycling strategy of a two-stage closed-loop supply chain composed of OEMs and 4S stores. The results show that the key factor affecting the recycling subsidy strategy of OEMs and 4S stores in the closed-loop supply chain is the rate of increase in revenue after subsidies from both parties. When both of them increase the revenue after recycling subsidies, both sides will adopt a recycling subsidy strategy; when the cost of subsidies is higher than the increased revenue after subsidies, the government can encourage enterprises to participate in power battery recycling with tax subsidies or other incentives.

Key words: power battery, closed-loop supply chain, new energy vehicles, evolutionary games, recycling subsidy