股票发行询价制度下的合谋行为研究

商业研究

股票发行询价制度下的合谋行为研究

冯琳

中央财经大学经济学院，北京 100081

收稿日期:2016-09-30 出版日期:2017-01-10
作者简介:冯琳（1989-），女，山东潍坊人，中央财经大学经济学院博士研究生，研究方向：资金运行与宏观调控。
基金资助:
国家社科基金项目，项目编号：12BJY004

A Study of the Collusion Behavior in the IPO Inquiry System

FENG Lin

School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China

Received:2016-09-30 Online:2017-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以新股发行询价制度为背景，引入“合谋”建立了一个监管机构-拟上市公司-保荐人的三层委托代理模型，具体考察最优防范合谋的机制特征，指出要防范发行询价中的合谋应加强社会媒体对新股发行询价过程中的监督，提高对合谋发行的行为惩罚力度，提高对内幕交易和操纵股价的威慑力；并在此基础上对现实询价过程中存在的合谋行为进一步分析，主要包括：防范合谋行为要充分发挥社会媒体的监督能力，公司的透明度与合谋行为存在密切关系，承销商和保荐人缺乏良好的激励约束机制。

关键词: 询价制度, 合谋行为, 防范合谋契约

Abstract: Based on the IPO inquiry system, the paper introduces the collusion behavior to the inquiry system and sets up a principal-agent model of three layers which include the regulator, quasi-listed companies and the sponsors, and studies the characteristic of optimal collusion-proof behavior, pointing out keys which prevent the collusion behavior: strengthening the supervision of social media to the IPO inquiry process, increasing the collusion behavior penalties and improving the deterrence to insider trading and price manipulation. The paper also analyses the collusion behavior in reality, which include the following points: making full use of the supervision of the social media to collusion behavior, there is a close relationship between the company′s transparency and the collusion behavior,and there is no an effective incentive constraint mechanism between the underwriters and the sponsors.

Key words: inquiry system, collusion behavior, collusion-proof contract

冯琳. 股票发行询价制度下的合谋行为研究[J]. 商业研究.

FENG Lin. A Study of the Collusion Behavior in the IPO Inquiry System[J]. 商业研究.

参考文献

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