技术溢出与产品差异对政府补贴和制造商减排决策的影响

商业研究

技术溢出与产品差异对政府补贴和制造商减排决策的影响

徐朗1，汪传旭1，罗珈2,3

1.上海海事大学经济管理学院，上海 201306；2.利兹大学工商管理学院，英国伦敦 LS29JT； 3.普利茅斯大学格林威治管理学院，英国普利茅斯 PL46RN

收稿日期:2017-01-25 出版日期:2017-06-16
作者简介:徐朗（1990-），男，湖北荆州人，上海海事大学经济管理学院博士研究生，研究方向：能源经济、物流与供应链管理；汪传旭(1967-)，男，安徽安庆人，上海海事大学经济管理学院教授，博士生导师，工学博士，研究方向：物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目，项目编号：71373157,71403120；江苏高校哲学社会科学重点项目，项目编号：2015ZDIXM039；上海海事大学研究生创新项目，项目编号：2016ycx074；上海海事大学优秀博士论文培育项目，项目编号：2016BXLP005。

The Effects of Technology Spillover and Product Differentiation on Government Subsidy and Manufacturer Emission Reduction Decision

XU Lang1，WANG Chuan-xu1，LUO Jia2,3

1.School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University，Shanghai 201306,China； 2.College of Business Administration, University of Leeds，London LS29JT,Britain； 3. GSM-GREENWICH School of Management, University of Plymouth，Plymouth PL46RN,Britain

Received:2017-01-25 Online:2017-06-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对政府补贴和制造商减排投入之间的矛盾，本文构建了政府不补贴制造商（NS情景）、补贴制造商减排投入（IS情景）以及补贴制造商生产产量（QS情景）下三阶段政府与双寡头制造商的博弈模型，探讨制造商的生产产量和减排投入策略，并比较不同补贴情景下制造商利润和社会总福利的差异。研究发现，政府补贴能有效地提高制造商利润和社会总福利，投入补贴策略下的最优补贴率与技术溢出率呈正相关性关系，产量补贴策略下的最优补贴率与技术溢出率呈“U”型关系，而无论何种补贴策略最优补贴率均与产品差异性呈负相关性。上述结论为政府补贴政策提供理论依据，也为企业减排投入提供对策思路。

关键词: 双寡头市场, 最优策略, 政府补贴, 减排投入

Abstract: Aiming at the contradiction between government subsidy and manufacturer emission reduction investment, the paper builds game model of government and duopoly manufacturers under three scenarios: the manufacturers without subsidies (Scenario NS)，subsidy to emission reduction investment (Scenario IS) and subsidy to the quantity (Scenario QS), to discuss manufacturers′ quantity and investment strategies and compare the differences between profits and social welfare in different subsidy scenarios. The research finds that government subsidies could improve both manufacturers′ profit and social welfare effectively, the optimal subsidy-rate under IS scenario is positively related to technology spillovers, while they show a U-shaped relationship under QS scenario, but optimal subsidy rate is negatively related to product differentiation under any subsidy strategy. The above conclusions provide the theoretical basis for the government subsidy policy, and also provide the countermeasures for the enterprises to emission reduction investment.

Key words: duopolistic market, optimal strategy, government subsidy, emission reduction investment

徐朗1，汪传旭1，罗珈2,3. 技术溢出与产品差异对政府补贴和制造商减排决策的影响[J]. 商业研究.

XU Lang1，WANG Chuan-xu1，LUO Jia2,3. The Effects of Technology Spillover and Product Differentiation on Government Subsidy and Manufacturer Emission Reduction Decision[J]. 商业研究.

参考文献

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