商业研究

商业研究

• 经营管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

公司控制权、经理人员项目选择与交叉持股

白默   

  1. 天津商业大学 商学院/管理创新与评价研究中心，天津 300134
  • 收稿日期:2017-03-16 出版日期:2017-08-24
  • 作者简介:白默（1977-），男，沈阳人，天津商业大学商学院/管理创新与评价研究中心副教授，管理学博士，研究方向：公司财务管理、财务会计。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社科青年基金项目“公司股权投资下的价值效应与盈余管理研究”，项目编号：12YJC630001；国家自然科学青年基金项目“压力遵从还是享乐驱动？关系情境中群体消费者冲动购买行为的发生机理研究”，项目编号：71602146。

Corporate Control, Manager′s Project Choice and Cross-Shareholdings Model

BAI Mo   

  1. School of Business/Management and Evaluation Innovation Center, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, China
  • Received:2017-03-16 Online:2017-08-24

摘要： 随着中国股市步入“全流通”时代，围绕上市公司控制权争夺的案例越来越多，公司管理层通过损害股东利益的方式抵制潜在收购者收购的行为也屡见不鲜。本文通过讨论公司间交叉持股，考察其对公司创始股东、经理人员和可能取得控制权的潜在接管者之间的利益博弈均衡产生的影响。研究发现，如果交叉持股的公司之间存在一个旨在保证公司不会出售其他公司股票的制裁机制，那么交叉持股会使得参与博弈的各方利益均得以提升，公司的经理人员也可以着眼于长远利益，不必为规避潜在收购者的威胁而采取损害公司价值的短视行为。研究结论为交叉持股对公司绩效的影响提供了新的理论证据，即交叉持股有助于经理人员选择增加公司价值的投资项目，从而提升公司绩效和价值。

关键词: 控制权, 项目选择, 交叉持股

Abstract: With Chinese stock market entering into the “full circulation” era, the cases around control of the listed companies are more and more, and management′s resisting the acquisitions of potential acquirers through harming shareholders′ interests is also common. The paper examines its effects on the interests of the company′s atomistic shareholders, managers, and potential receivers who may have control, by discussing inter-firm cross-holdings. The study finds that if there is a sanction between cross-share companies that ensures company does not sell shares of other companies, cross-holdings will benefit all parties involved in the game, and the company′s managers can focus on the long-term interest, and will not take short-sighted acts that harm the value of the company in order to circumvent the threat of potential acquirers. The conclusion provides new theoretical evidence for the impact of cross-shareholding on corporate performance, that is, cross-shareholdings helps managers select investment projects that increase corporate value to enhance corporate performance and value.

Key words: corporate control, project choice, cross- shareholdings model