注释:
①现实中由于供应商与零售商存在长期合作关系,相互之间的经营状况都了解得比较清楚。为了维持相互之间的长期合作,假设零售商也会如实的向供应商揭露自己的资金水平。同时很多研究文献也都做了类似的研究假设,如陈祥锋(2013)。
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