商业研究

商业研究

• 公司治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

国企民营化与高管的薪酬业绩敏感性 ——基于我国上市公司民营化样本实践的检验

白俊1,2，王婉婉1   

  1. (石河子大学 1.经济与管理学院；2.公司治理与管理创新研究中心，新疆 石河子 832000)
  • 收稿日期:2018-05-06 出版日期:2019-01-17
  • 作者简介:白俊（1971-），女，新疆石河子人，石河子大学经济与管理学院/公司治理与管理创新研究中心教授，管理学博士，研究方向：公司金融；王婉婉（1993-），本文通讯作者，女，安徽淮北人，石河子大学经济与管理学院研究生，研究方向：制度环境与公司财务政策。

Privatization of State-owned Enterprises and the Sensitivity of Executive Pay Performance: A Test based on the Sample of Privatization of Listed Companies in China

BAI Jun1,2,WANG Wan-wan1   

  1. (1.School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000,China; 2. Center for Corporate Governance and Management Innovation, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000,China)
  • Received:2018-05-06 Online:2019-01-17

摘要： 对国企民营化改革效果的期望中，理性的受让方势必要求企业的高管薪酬契约更加有效，进而有助于提升企业业绩。本文以2003-2014年我国上市公司数据为样本，采用双重差分的方法考察国企民营化对高管薪酬激励有效性的影响。国企民营化显著提高了高管的薪酬，但降低了高管的薪酬业绩敏感性。进一步研究发现，按照民营化程度分组，在高管变更与民营化后不存在国有股权的样本中，高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著下降；依据国企民营化后的公司治理结构分析，在国企民营化后的股权制衡低与不存在机构投资者样本中，高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著下降。研究表明，提升企业高管薪酬激励的有效性，并非民营化简单地一改就灵，不同的公司治理、企业规模、民营化的程度等，都对其有影响。所以，国企民化改革需要把握好节奏和程度，要重视适度保留和发挥国有股权成分的治理作用。另外，研究结论的拓展反思，对国有企业现行的高管薪酬制度的管理与改革有启示意义。

关键词: 国企民营化, 薪酬业绩敏感性, 民营化程度, 公司治理

Abstract: Under the debate of privatization of state-owned enterprises, rational transferee is bound to require executives′ remuneration contracts to be more effective, which helps to improve corporate performance.The paper takes data of listed companies in China in 2003-2014 years as samples, and investigates the influence of privatization of state-owned enterprises on executive compensation incentive effectiveness by difference-in-difference method. The study finds that the privatization of state owned enterprises has significantly improved the pay of executives, while reduced the sensitivity of executives pay performance. Further study finds that, according to the degree of privatization of state-owned equity group, in this ways that do not exist state ownership after management change and privatization, the sensitivity of executive pay performance decreased significantly; according to corporate governance, the equity balance and the institutional investors help to ease the sensitivity of executive pay and corporate performance after the privatization of state owned enterprises. The research shows that improving the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive is not a simple change of privatization. Different corporate governance, enterprise size, and the degree of privatization have an impact on it.Therefore, the reform of the privatization of state-owned enterprises needs to grasp the rhythm and degree, and pay attention to the moderate retention and play the governance role of the state-owned equity component. In addition, the expansion and reflection of the conclusions of the study will provide enlightenment for the management and reform of the current executive compensation system in state-owned enterprises.

Key words: privatization of state-owned enterprises, the sensitivity of executive pay performance, degree of privatization, corporate governance