Abstract: Taking cases of executives corruption disclosed by stock exchange corporations and media from 2004 to 2014 as samples, and based on the differences of districts and industries of the managerial labor market competition, this paper tests the constrained impacts of the managerial labor market competition on executive′s power and behaviors. The results show that the managerial labor market competition′s constrain effects on executive corruptions is stronger in the east regions than in the central and west regions, in the non-monopoly industries than the monopoly industry; the managerial labor market′s competition has some constrain on private corporate executive corruptions, and the constrain effects increases while the degree of the region and industry managerial labor market become strong; as to the failure of the state-owned enterprise managerial labor market, the managerial labor market does not constrain the state-owned enterprises′ executive corruptions.

Key words: state-owned enterprises, executive corruption, managerial labor market competition, marketization