Whether the Application System can Restrain the Implementation of Anti-dumping?

Abstract

Abstract: According to the WTO anti-dumping code, the anti-dumping investigation should meet the requirements of the application system. This paper constructs a dynamic game model of anti-dumping duty to discuss the effect of application system on the implementation of anti-dumping measures. The research shows that to the competitive domestic industry, if the marginal cost of the domestic firm is higher than that of the foreign firm, the application system will certainly restrain the implementation of anti-dumping; if the marginal cost of the domestic firm is equal to or lower than that of the foreign firm, the application system will not restrain the implementation of anti-dumping. Therefore, the reconstruction of the application system should be an important aspect of the future revision of the WTO anti-dumping code, and should use the coordination role of industry association to launch anti-dumping application.

Key words: anti-dumping, WTO code, public interest

HAO Liang. Whether the Application System can Restrain the Implementation of Anti-dumping?[J]. 商业研究.

References

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