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Pricing and Cooperation Strategy of Enterprises′ Carbon Emission Reduction in Closed-loop Supply Chain

LI Hui1, WANG Chuan-xu1, OU Wei2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;2. School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa 923-1292, Japan
  • Received:2017-01-17 Online:2017-05-25

Abstract: The different modes of cooperation between manufacturers and retailers have different effects on the emission reduction rate, recovery rate, pricing, profits and emission reduction utility in closed-loop supply chain. Considering closed-loop supply chain consisted of single manufacturer, retailer and third-party recycler, the paper builds decision models for the emissions reduction rate, the recovery rate and price under the situation of the non-cooperation, incomplete-cooperation (the emission reduction cost-sharing contract and bargaining), full-cooperation, and carries out comparative analysis. The results show that, in general, when the full-cooperation achieves the highest level of emission reduction and recovery and the lowest retail price, it also achieves the highest joint profit and emission reduction utility; for two kinds of incomplete-cooperation, except for the manufacturer′s profits, the emission reduction level, the recycling level, the wholesale price, the retail price,the retailer′s profit, the joint supply chain profit, the third party′s profit and the emission reduction utility in the emission reduction bargaining are better than in the emission reduction cost-sharing. In reality, the most ideal model of full-cooperation emission reduction is difficult to reach. Therefore, government should take measures to promote two kinds of cooperative emission reduction ways.

Key words: cooperation, emission reduction, closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game