Abstract: Considering the information asymmetry of fair preference, this paper studies the effects of wholesale price contract on supplier-retailer game and supply chain coordination where the market demand is dependent on the effort. This study proves that when retailer is fully rational, the retailer′s effort in symmetric information is lower than that in asymmetric case, but the effort comparison is opposite when the retailer cares about fairness; if retailer′s fairness is intense enough or when the retailer is fully rational and the fairness information is asymmetric, retailer′s profit will exceed supplier′s;whether fairness information is symmetric or not, wholesale price contract can′t eliminate but can alleviate the “double marginalization problem” and take the role of fair mechanism in the supply chain profit distribution. Besides, this study improved some theoretical analyses of existing supply chain contract and modified some research conclusions.

Key words: fairness preference;information asymmetry;wholesale price contract, effort