Multiple Subjects′ Synergetic Innovation System Evolutionary Game based on
 Two-wheel Drive

Abstract

Abstract: Multiple subjects′ synergetic innovation is a complicated systematic engineering.Using the evolutionary game method can analyze the operation mechanism of multiplesubjects from dynamic perspective, and fundamentally explore the factors that influence the stability of synergetic innovation. The paper constructed a multiple subjects′ operation mechanism based on national innovation driven development strategic framework, which includes environment-driving and innovation driving, and built evolutionary game model to analyze various innovation objects′ strategy choice in synergetic innovation, then used Jacobian Matrix to judge its stability of strategies. The evolutionary game results show that, when the various subjects′ demands are satisfied, the multiple subjects′ synergetic innovation system can keep stable; the knowledge difference between different innovation subjects and the stability of synergetic innovation shows opposite trend; good synergetic effect and independent internal supervision mechanism can effectively improve the stability of synergetic innovation system.

Key words: multiple subjects, synergetic innovation, evolutionary game, stable strategy

WU Wei-hong, DING Zhang-ming, ZHANG Ai-mei. Multiple Subjects′ Synergetic Innovation System Evolutionary Game based on Two-wheel Drive[J]. 商业研究.

References

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Multiple Subjects′ Synergetic Innovation System Evolutionary Game based on Two-wheel Drive

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